The relative importance of undesirable truths by Bortolotti, Lisa
 
 
The relative importance of undesirable truths
Bortolotti, Lisa
DOI:
10.1007/s11019-012-9449-x
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution (CC BY)
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Bortolotti, L 2013, 'The relative importance of undesirable truths', Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, vol. 16,
no. 4, pp. 683-690. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-012-9449-x
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Eligibility for repository : checked 01/07/2014
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTION
The relative importance of undesirable truths
Lisa Bortolotti
Published online: 19 November 2012
 The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract The right not to know is often defended on the
basis of the principle of respect for personal autonomy. If I
choose not to acquire personal information that impacts on
my future prospects, such a choice should be respected,
because I should be able to decide whether to access
information about myself and how to use it. But, according
to the incoherence objection to the right not to know in the
context of genetic testing, the choice not to acquire genetic
information undermines the capacity for autonomous
decision making. The claim is that it is incoherent to
defend a choice that is inimical to autonomy by appealing
to autonomy. In this paper, I suggest that the choice not to
know in the context of genetic testing does not undermine
self-authorship, which is a key aspect of autonomous
decision making. In the light of this, the incoherence
objection to the right not to know seems less compelling.
Keywords Right not to know  Genetic testing  Personal
narratives  Autonomy  Open future  Self-authorship 
Self-knowledge
The incoherence objection to the right not to know
Consider the following case. Francis and his son George
may have inherited the gene for Huntington disease.
Whereas George wants to know whether he has the gene
for the disease, Francis prefers to live his life without
knowing. The problem is that, if George decides to be
tested and results positive, then this means that Francis also
has the gene. It would be difficult for George to keep the
information from his father, so George’s wish to know is in
conflict with Francis’s wish not to know. Does Francis
have a right not to know?1 If so, where does this right come
from?
Scenarios such as the conflict of interests between
George and Francis illustrate the potential impact that a
right not to know could have on people’s healthcare
options, on their life projects, and even on their relation-
ships with genetically related family members. That is why
the choice not to know is so widely discussed in the
philosophical literature, and a lively debate centres on
whether such a choice should be safeguarded as a right (see
for instance, Solbakk et al. 2009; Hay¨ry et al. 2007;
Chadwick et al. 1997; Ra¨ikka¨ 1998).
The main justification for the right not to know is that
one should be able to exercise at least some control over
access to information about one’s health conditions and
prospects, and that one’s desire not to know whether one
will develop a certain condition should be respected. These
considerations are usually grounded in the principle of
respect for personal autonomy (e.g., Andorno 2004;
Human Genetics Commission 2000, p. 19). But it has been
argued that it is a mistake to defend the right not to know
on the basis of personal autonomy, especially in the context
of genetic testing.
One argument is that the choice not to know cannot
always be justified on the basis of the principle of the
autonomy of the individual, because the information
obtained via genetic testing does not always belong to an
individual alone. In the scenario above, we saw that if
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1 This example is taken freely from The Exploratorium, a resource of
UC Berkeley Program in Genetic Counseling and Georgetown
University Medical Center.
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George had the gene for Huntington disease, then Francis
would too. Francis does not want to know whether he has
the gene, but George does. When individuals have con-
flicting interests and preferences, and information disclosed
to one cannot be easily kept from the other, it is hard to
respect the interests and preferences of both at once.
Genetic information is typically shared, and an examina-
tion of its characteristics may invite a revision of our eth-
ical framework which is based on the autonomy of the
person as a self-standing individual.
Genetics supports a relational understanding of the
person and therefore that genetic ethics requires
ethical models which respect both individuals and
groups (Widdows 2009, p. 173).
Another argument is that it is incoherent to justify the
choice not to know on the basis of the principle of personal
autonomy, because not knowing undermines the capacity
to make autonomous choices. Consider our initial scenario.
George wants to know whether he has the gene for
Huntington disease, and if he obtains this knowledge, his
future decisions will be informed by it. Francis prefers not
to know and, if he manages to remain in ignorance about
the possibility of developing Huntington disease, his future
decisions will not be affected. According to the incoher-
ence objection, George’s and Francis’s individual prefer-
ences are not neutral with respect to autonomy: George
does not compromise the autonomy of his future decision-
making, whereas Francis does.
Different versions of this objection have been put for-
ward (see Harris and Keywood 2001; Malpas 2005; Rhodes
1998). Here are the key formulations:
[W]e cannot defend a right not to know our genetic
information in the name of autonomy alone. […]
Autonomy […] demands that we exercise our
capacity to reason and this surely entails the pursuit
of pertinent genetic information not the rejection of
it. (Malpas 2005)
Now if autonomy is the ground for my right to
determine my own course, it cannot also be the ground
for not determining my own course. If autonomy
determines my right to knowledge, it cannot also
justify my refusing to be informed. I may not be aware
of the moral implications of ceding autonomy by
insisting on genetic ignorance, but the ramifications
are there, nevertheless. (Rhodes 1998, p. 18)
[W]here I give someone (against their will) reliable
information about themselves or their condition
which is relevant to decisions they must make I may
violate a liberty they assert but I do not violate their
autonomy, for the information I give them is
necessary for their autonomous decision making.
(Harris and Keywood 2001, page 419, my emphasis)
In the rest of the paper I shall concentrate on the version of
the incoherence objection put forward by John Harris and
Kirsty Keywood, according to which knowledge of genetic
information is necessary to the capacity for autonomous
decision-making. The objection thus formulated invites us
to reflect not only on the legitimacy of the right not to
know, but also on what is valuable in the making of
autonomous choices. It deserves attention because it has
significant implications. If we accept this version of the
incoherence objection, then we also have to accept that the
choice of genetic ignorance2 is a choice that undermines
the autonomy of future choices, and in this respect it is
comparable to letting other people shape one’s life by
selling oneself into slavery, or to taking drugs knowing that
they will compromise one’s capacity to make rational
decisions.
Contemporary studies in psychology and psychiatry
support the general idea, frequently developed in leading
philosophical theories of autonomy, that self-knowledge
contributes to the exercise of personal autonomy in a way
that promotes successful self-governance and well-being
(see for instance, Wilson 2002). But the claim that self-
knowledge enhances the quality of one’s autonomous
choices is different from the claim that genetic information
is necessary for autonomous decision making. First, it is
not obvious that genetic information about oneself is the
type of self-knowledge that contributes to the making of
autonomous choices; and second, the nature of the contri-
bution of genetic information to autonomous decision-
making needs to be reviewed. Is such information really
necessary for the exercise of autonomy?
In this paper I offer some reasons to resist the claim that
makes the incoherence objection plausible, but I shall not
offer any defence of the legitimacy of the right not to know,
as I share the view defended by Widdows and by Harris and
Keywood that one’s choice not to know should not be made
into a right which trumps other morally relevant consider-
ations. In ‘‘Autonomy as self-authorship’’, I describe one
central feature of the capacity for autonomous decision
making, i.e. self-authorship. (In my interpretation, this is also
the feature Harris and Keywood emphasise when they talk
about the value of autonomy.) I suggest that self-authorship
is not necessarily compromised by the choice of genetic
ignorance. In ‘‘Not all knowledge about oneself is necessary
to autonomy’’, I compare the acquisition of genetic infor-
mation with another form of knowledge that can be similarly
distressing or unsettling, at least in the short term. This is
knowledge of one’s biases in deliberation. I argue that
2 In this paper, by the expression ‘genetic ignorance’ I mean the
rejection of personal information obtained via genetic testing.
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information about one’s biases in deliberation necessarily
contributes to self-authorship, whereas information resulting
from genetic testing does not. My conclusion will be that
choosing not to know information about oneself available
through genetic testing is compatible with self-authorship,
and thus the incoherence objection remains unconvincing.
Autonomy as self-authorship
What we mean by autonomy is crucial to the debate about
the right not to know and its justification. For instance,
Matti Ha¨yry and Tuija Takala argue that the perceived
conflict between exercising autonomy and the choice not to
know is legitimate only if we intend autonomy as the
entitlement and the obligation to decide in accordance to
the best information available (Ha¨yry and Takala 2001,
page 411). If information likely to be relevant to an agent’s
decisions is withheld, then the agent cannot make fully
informed decisions and autonomy is compromised. But if
we mean something else by autonomy, for instance the
entitlement to make decisions on whatever grounds the
agent wishes, as long as she does not cause harm to others,
then the choice not to know does not seem to conflict with
the exercise of autonomy.
I want to develop Ha¨yry and Takala’s insight that the
notion of autonomy matters to an assessment of the inco-
herence objection. According to lay conceptions and recent
philosophical accounts (e.g., Frankfurt 1988; Dworkin 1988;
Moran 2001; Velleman 2006; McLeod 2002), autonomous
agents are able to shape their future, within constraints set by
their own personal limitations and their physical and social
environment. They do so by developing a life plan which
reflects their beliefs, desires and values. In some sense, for
autonomous agents the future is open and can be authored.
The ability to choose our own life plan is arguably
one of the essential conditions of the good life. What
does this ability require? People must have cognitive
and emotional skills that make them able to (a) com-
pare (consciously or unconsciously) different life
plans, (b) select one among those life plans they are
able to consider, (c) transform this choice into the
intention to behave in accordance with the chosen
plan and (d) transform this intention into behaviour
that actually conforms to the chosen option. More-
over, people must have skills that allow them to
pursue different life plans with some definite chance
of success, and they must be in a social context where
these different life plans can actually be pursued.
(Mameli 2007, p. 91)
One important aspect of this conception of autonomous
agency is that people can become authors of their own life
story, and this act of self-authorship is manifested (among
other things) in the goals they set for themselves and in the
choices they make. Agents pursue those goals and make
those choices that are important to the type of person they
are or they want to become, and that are largely consistent
with their beliefs, desires, and values.
This is also the aspect of autonomy that Harris and
Keywood (2001) focus on when they attack the legitimacy
of a right not to know. They write:
The point of autonomy, the point of choosing and
having the freedom to choose between competing
conceptions of how, and indeed why, to live, is
simply that it is only thus that our lives become in any
real sense our own. The value of our lives is the value
we give to our lives. And we do this, so far as this is
possible at all, by shaping our lives for ourselves. Our
own choices, decisions and preferences help to make
us what we are, for each helps us to confirm and
modify our own character and enables us to develop
and to understand ourselves. (Harris and Keywood
2001, p. 420).
Obviously, knowledge of different sorts informs the
making of autonomous choices. In a successful life plan
goals are truly valued by an agent and are achievable,
having being selected on the basis of an agent’s beliefs,
desires and values, of her competencies and limitations,
and of the relevant features of the surrounding physical and
social environment. It is important for the agent to pursue
her genuine interests and take into account existing
constraints (Allport 1937; Ford 1992; Austin and Vancou-
ver 1996; Armitage and Christian 2004; Kuhl and Beck-
man 1985). If the agent has a mistaken conception of what
is important to her, she is likely to set for herself goals
whose fulfilment will not make her happy. If she has an
inflated conception of her own talents, she is likely to set
for herself goals that are too ambitious, and this is likely to
result in poor management of her resources and ultimately
in failure and frustration. If other difficulties and potential
obstacles are underestimated or ignored, the agent’s life
plan may turn out to be unrealistic and may need to
undergo a number of revisions and adjustments, which
come with considerable psychological costs.
Information of the kind I have described certainly con-
tributes to the making of rational life choices and to the fulf-
ilment of one’s life goals, but should it be regarded as
necessary to the capacity for autonomous decision making and
self-governance? If an agent has an accurate understanding of
her own potential and of the features of her environment that
are relevant to the attainment of her goals, she will develop a
life plan that is feasible and she will be more successful in
pursuing her life goals. The aspirations of a woman who
wishes to distinguish herself in the pursuit of science in a
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country where women are discouraged from going to uni-
versity may be frustrated. Similarly, a very talented musician
who does not realise how severe his arthritis is becoming may
find that his dream of making a living as a performing pianist
will not come true. The point I want to press with these
examples is that personal information and information about
the surrounding environment impinge significantly on the
feasibility of life plans and on the likelihood of success, but is
not necessary to the capacity most human agents have to shape
their own lives. Failing to obtain such information does not
rule out self-governance altogether.
There are forms of knowledge that are necessary to self-
authorship, and a good candidate is knowledge of one’s
own attitudes. Consider the following case. Gina learns that
she suffers from a medical condition causing infertility, and
this reduces the reproductive options readily available to
her. She decides to start saving to be able to afford infer-
tility treatment at a private clinic. Knowledge of her
medical condition and of the options available to her does
affect her decisions, and allows her to adjust her life plan to
the newly discovered constraints. However, even if Gina
had never discovered about her medical condition and its
consequences, she would have preserved the capacity for
rational decision making and self-governance. The differ-
ence would have been that her life plan would have had
fewer chances to be fulfilled. Whether she discovers or
remains ignorant about her chances to reproduce naturally,
Gina engages in self-authorship by determining the best
course of action given her attitudes and the constraints of
the surrounding environment she is aware of.
Now let’s tweak the scenario. Suppose Gina has inclu-
ded motherhood in her life plan because, in the community
where she lives, women of her age and status are expected
to reproduce. If she examined her own beliefs, desires and
values more closely, she would find that she does not have
any strong desire to raise children, and that she is perfectly
fulfilled by her successful career and her happy relationship
with her husband. But people in her close social circle keep
asking her why she does not want children, and she feels
the pressure of their expectations. In this version of the
scenario, Gina’s imperfect self-knowledge undermines the
authorship of her choices. The choice to become a mother
is not one that is genuinely supported by her attitudes, and
her life plan does not reflect her genuine inclinations. We
could describe the case differently and say that external
pressure has conditioned and moulded her personal pref-
erences to the point that she acquired an aspiration that she
did not have to start with. But even so, it is likely that her
aspiration to become a mother badly coheres with some of
her other aspirations, thereby creating tensions in her life
project overall. In this case, partial ignorance of her mind
and lack of awareness of the external factors affecting her
attitudes undermine Gina’s claim to self-authorship.
We need to ask now whether personal information
obtained via genetic testing is the type of information that
contributes to making more feasible life plans (such as the
information Gina acquires about her infertility) or the type
of information without which self-authorship and self-
governance are compromised (such as Gina’s knowledge of
her genuine attitude towards motherhood). Harris and
Keywood argue for the latter option.
[A]bsence of crucial information is inimical to self
government, to the ability to control one’s own des-
tiny, and hence inimical to autonomy. Ignorance of
crucial information is inimical to autonomy in a way
that other autonomy-limiting choices are not. For
where the individual is ignorant of information that
bears upon rational life choices she is not in a posi-
tion to be self-governing. If I lack information, for
example about how long my life is likely to continue
I cannot make rational plans for the rest of my life. If
I do not know that my life is only likely to last five
more years, rather than say twenty-five more, many
of my priorities will be inappropriate and some will
be self-defeating. (Harris and Keywood 2001,
p. 421).
I agree with the authors that there is absence of information
which is ‘‘inimical to self government’’, but I do not think
that the absence of genetic information fits this description.
Why should an agent’s ignorance of her life expectancy
compromise her capacity for rational decision making or
self-governance? Her decisions and plans can be rational
given the knowledge at her disposal, which does not
routinely include information about when exactly she will
die. More generally, agents shape their lives and pursue
their goals in absence of complete and accurate information
about their future health prospects and to consider them
lacking in self-governance because of their partial igno-
rance is raising the bar too high.
Let’s go back to our initial case of genetic testing for
Huntington disease. It is plausible that the reason why
Francis does not want to know whether he has the gene for
Huntington disease is that he does not want some options to
be ruled out in advance by that information. He does not
want his long-term plans to be shaped by the lingering fear
of developing the disease (Bortolotti and Widdows 2011).
George feels differently. He welcomes the possibility of
constructing his life plan in the light of information about
his probable future state of health, and wants to start
developing strategies that will help him face the difficulties
ahead. This makes good sense, given that Huntington dis-
ease in particular does impair one’s capacity for rational
decision making. Gaining information about the likelihood
of developing a debilitating condition such as Huntington
disease has an impact on the decisions an agent makes, as
686 L. Bortolotti
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Gina learning that she is not likely to reproduce naturally
leads her to develop new strategies to achieve her goal of
becoming a mother. However, choosing ignorance of
genetic information does not necessarily make one’s future
choices less authentic or less genuinely authored—those
choices can still be in tune with one’s beliefs, desires and
values.
Rejecting genetic information (when available) does not
necessarily compromise self-authorship, which is a core
feature of the capacity for autonomous decision making
(or, as Harris and Keywood say, ‘‘the point of autonomy’’,
p. 420). Information about whether Francis and George
have the gene for Huntington disease is relevant to howo-
pen their futures are and to whether they need to make
contingency plans in order to achieve the goals they have
set for themselves. However, rejecting such information
does not make their future closed or unauthored. Francis
and George preserve the capacity to shape their future by
setting goals and making choices whether or not they
decide to know about their likelihood to develop Hun-
tington disease. The fact that they make different choices
about whether to acquire genetic information is a mani-
festation of their different ways to shape their own future.
One might find Francis’s way objectionable on the grounds
that it does not allow him to develop contingency plans, but
it seems far too strong to regard his choice as irrational,
which we would be tempted to do if we were to embrace
the incoherence objection.
Not all knowledge about oneself is necessary
to autonomy
I suggested that an agent’s knowledge that she may
develop a disease such as Huntington does not impact on
her capacity to write her own story, although it may con-
tribute to changing the way in which the story is written. I
also suggested there are forms of knowledge, that is,
knowledge of the agent’s own mind and her awareness of
the external factors that influence her attitudes, which have
a more central role to play in enabling the making of
autonomous choices and can even be regarded as necessary
conditions for self-authorship. Reliable information about
one’s own attitudes (beliefs, desires, values) is not just
conducive to choices that are genuinely authored, but
seems to be necessary for self-authorship.
One way in which the connection between self-knowl-
edge and autonomy has been articulated in the recent
philosophical and psychological literature is via the notion
of self-narratives. Agents integrate significant episodes
of their lives into a coherent story, a self-narrative, and
recognise themselves in the leading character of the story
they tell. The narrative is not a mere description or
interpretation of the leading character’s attitudes and
actions, but a way to impose coherence on life events, and
to guide future behaviour on the basis of previously made
commitments (Velleman 2006; McAdams 1997).
One thing a deliberate decision accomplishes, when it
creates an intention, is to establish a constraint by
which other preferences and decisions are to be gui-
ded. (Frankfurt 1988, page 175)
Some accounts of self-narratives focus on an individual
conception of herself as an agent, but actual self-narratives
are never developed in isolation from the social and physical
environment in which the agent is embedded. Social
expectations and cultural influences are reflected in the
stories agents tell, and even in the plot which is generally
structured around initial goals, partial achievements and set-
backs, and final success. Stories are shaped not just by the
agent’s understanding of her own beliefs, desires and values,
but also by her social roles and relationships.
A claim that has received empirical support is that good
self-narratives (that is, narratives that represent more or less
accurately key events in one’s life and are largely coherent)
contribute to unified agency and psychological well-being.
When self-narratives diverge widely from reality or reflect a
fragmented set of attitudes, then it is difficult for the agent
to coordinate with other agents, to engage effectively with
the surrounding environment and to develop a unifying
sense of self and purpose which supports long-term plan-
ning. Self-narratives need to be shared. The social envi-
ronment to which the agent is connected provides a useful
feedback mechanism on the development of the narrative,
and the views of friends and family help the agent inhabit an
inter-subjective space where her representation of reality is
constrained not just by reality itself but also by other peo-
ple’s representations of it.
People with psychiatric disorders in which autobio-
graphical memories or salience mechanisms are disrupted
have been described as ‘‘unreliable autobiographers’’
(Gerrans 2009) and their success in developing and pur-
suing life projects has been questioned (Bortolotti et al.
2012). Correspondence between the self-narrative and
significant life events prevents one from becoming isolated
from one’s social context and detached from the sur-
rounding environment. Reporting autobiographical facts
inaccurately or unreliably does not yield cooperative
communication and, as a result, alienates others. The per-
son with a very idiosyncratic narrative may be avoided or
ignored. Moreover, the gap between the narrative and
reality engenders failed predictions and unsuccessful
explanations of personal events, which compromise
autonomous decision making.
In this framework, knowledge of the self matters to
accurate and coherent narratives, and accurate and coherent
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narratives, in turn, matter to autonomous agency.3 Impor-
tant decisions about the agent’s future are informed by her
conception of her own attitudes and dispositions. By con-
tributing to the construction of largely accurate and
coherent self-narratives, knowledge of attitudes and dis-
positions becomes a core ingredient of self-authorship.
Circumstances that allow people to learn about themselves
in a way that can then inform their future decisions by
enhancing self-authorship enable the exercise of personal
autonomy and thus should be actively promoted. One good
example of such a circumstance is when, talking to a good
friend or even noting the casual comment of a stranger, one
discovers something about one’s own attitudes or disposi-
tions that one had not previously realised. When the new
information brought to one’s attention is not a desirable
one, this process of self-revelation–as Wilson (2002) calls
it–may be upsetting at first, but is likely to have lasting
benefits in the long run. Typically self-revelation occurs
when one acquires self-knowledge not by introspection but
by inference from how one’s behaviour is perceived or
interpreted by others. As an extension of everyday forms of
self-revelation, people can learn something new about
themselves by participating in a psychological study
(Bortolotti and Mameli 2006).
Consider the classic psychological study on obedience
to authority (Milgram 1974). It may have been distressing
for research participants to learn that they had been willing
to inflict pain on other human beings for the mere reason
that they were told to do so by someone in an apparent
position of authority—this piece of information is likely to
impact negatively on anybody’s self-conception and self-
esteem. Yet, this insight into one’s behavioural dispositions
potentially allows one to exercise better control on one’s
future behaviour, as one is alerted to the fact that in cer-
tain situations one could easily be led to act against one’s
own values. Similarly, in studies on how people make
hiring decisions, research participants are likely to learn at
debriefing that a variety of non-significant factors (gender,
ethnicity, overall appearance, and sexual preference)
impacted on how they assessed the performance of job
candidates. For instance, it has been shown that, when
qualifications and work experience are equivalent, over-
weight candidates are less likely to be selected, especially
if they are female (Pingitore et al. 1994). Learning that one
is disposed to discriminate against people who are over-
weight may be unsettling at first, as agents normally rep-
resent themselves in a positive light and are resistant to
acknowledging that their beliefs or actions may be preju-
diced. However, information learnt during one’s partici-
pation in a psychological study on prejudices in the job
market can be taken into account when the next important
hiring decision has to be made, to everybody’s advantage.
Autonomy is promoted by letting agents make their own
independent decisions, but also by ensuring agents have
knowledge of the factors affecting their decisions (Bor-
tolotti and Mameli 2006), especially when such factors can
lead agents to make decisions that are not consistent with
their explicit attitudes.
In the case of psychological experiments where agents
learn something new and important about the factors
influencing their decisions, the acquired self-knowledge
can have a negative effect on self-esteem, but can also
contribute significantly to making agents better at decision
making, thus directly affecting their capacity to make
autonomous choices that are authentic. Agents become
aware of potential biases and have the opportunity to
control the effects of such biases in future decisions. As a
result, they can make decisions that are more attuned to
their own beliefs, desires and values.
Is this form of self-knowledge, learning about one’s
behavioural dispositions via reliable testimony or by par-
ticipating in a psychological study, analogous to learning
the results of genetic testing with respect to its contribution
to autonomous decision making? We expect the acquisition
of both types of knowledge to be potentially distressing.
But in both cases the distress seems to be short-lived (Elms
1982; Kimmel 2001). Some research has been done on the
psychological effects of genetic testing on people who are
told that they may develop a disease such as breast cancer
or Huntington disease. Predictably, people whose tests are
positive tend to experience more distress than people
whose tests are negative, but distress usually remains in the
normal range and does not lead to either suicide or high
levels of anxiety or depression (Marteau and Croyle 1998;
Butow et al. 2003). When anxiety does increase as a result
of the newly acquired information, this is usually only in
the period immediately following the disclosure of the
information (Lerman et al. 2002, page 793). One interest-
ing result is that for some people knowing (even in case of
positive results) turns out to be less distressing than living
in uncertainty. In terms of psychological effects then, both
coming to know about one’s biases in decision making and
acquiring genetic information about oneself are potentially
distressing, but have not been shown to be likely causes of
severe anxiety or long-term depression.
What about analogies concerning the potential benefits of
acquiring information? In general terms, both types of
information have benefits. Acquiring genetic information, as
Harris and Keywood emphasise and as I have already sug-
gested, may allow an agent to revise and update her life plan
and account for previously unforeseen contingencies (e.g.
shorter life expectancy or declining cognitive capacities).
Moreover, if anxiety is caused by uncertainty, then knowing
3 Kennett and Matthews (2009) make this point with respect to
psychiatric disorders affecting memory.
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helps reduce anxiety. But the acquisition of genetic infor-
mation is unlikely to have the same type of authorship-
enabling effects on decision making that knowledge of one’s
biases in deliberation does have.
Knowledge that one’s judgement can be skewed or dis-
torted by biases or prejudices that are not immediately
accessible to introspection allows one to control the–often
hidden–factors influencing one’s choices, and make choices
that are better aligned with one’s attitudes. In other words, it
prevents agents from making decisions (e.g. hiring a less
qualified candidate because of gender biases) that would not
be supported by, and would clash with, their own attitudes.
Choosing genetic ignorance is not on a par with choosing to
be sold into slavery or choosing to take drugs that compro-
mise future decision making. This is because the acquisition
of genetic information does not seem to play a significant role
in helping agents to align their goals and their decisions with
their attitudes. As previously suggested, the acquisition of
genetic information may have implications for how open
one’s future turns out to be. Such knowledge can inform the
provision of contingency plans, and thus allow agents to
continue to pursue their life projects when unforeseen diffi-
culties and new constraints emerge; but it is not a necessary
ingredient of self-authorship.
If this analysis is correct, and choosing genetic ignorance
has no detrimental effect on autonomy as self-authorship,
then it is not clear why it should be incoherent to appeal to
autonomy in order to turn the choice not to know into a right.
Moreover, arguments like the incoherence objection may
have other undesirable consequences. They draw too much
attention to genetic information at the expense of other forms
of personal information that have the potential to make a
greater contribution to self-authorship. And they could also
blind us to individual differences in the way in which agents
choose to manage the uncertainty that their future inevitably
brings. That said, we need to acknowledge that the acquisi-
tion of personal information obtained via genetic testing is
valuable even if it turns out not to be necessary for autono-
mous decision making. One of the reasons why such
knowledge is indeed valuable lies in the importance of
contingency planning. Knowledge of forthcoming adversi-
ties may not be necessary for autonomous decision making,
but can help agents develop effective responses to such
adversities and adjust their life plans accordingly. This
requires resilience and creativity that are key and valuable
features of human agency (Carel 2009; Bortolotti 2010).
Conclusion
In this paper I discussed the incoherence objection which
claims that the right not to know in the context of genetic
information should not be grounded in autonomy because
choosing not to know compromises autonomous decision
making. I focused on one core aspect of autonomous
decision making, what I called ‘self-authorship’. Agents
can shape their own future by setting goals and making
choices that fit their attitudes and thus become the people
they want to be. I argued that choosing genetic ignorance
does not necessarily prevent agents from exercising self-
authorship.
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